Mon·Nov 8, 2021Monday·November 8, 2021

1. 01*

   Forward silicon vertex/tracking detector design and R$\&$D for the future Electron-Ion Collider

   Xuan Li🇺🇸 · Melynda Brooks🇺🇸 · Matt Durham🇺🇸 · Yasser Corrales Morales🇺🇸 · Astrid Morreale🇺🇸 · Christopher Prokop🇺🇸 · Eric Renner🇺🇸 · Walter Sondheim🇺🇸

   The proposed high-luminosity high-energy Electron-Ion Collider (EIC) will provide a clean environment to precisely study several fundamental questions in the fields of high-energy and nuclear physics . A low material budget and high granularity silicon vertex/tracking detector is critical to carry out a series of hadron and jet measurements at the future EIC especially for the heavy flavor product reconstruction or tagging. The conceptual design of a proposed forward silicon tracking detector with the pseudorapidity coverage from 1.2 to 3.5 has been developed in integration with different magnet options and the other EIC detector sub-systems. The tracking performance of this detector enables precise heavy flavor hadron and jet measurements in the hadron beam going direction. The detector R$\&$D for the proposed silicon technology candidates: Low Gain Avalanche Diode (LGAD) and radiation hard depleted Monolithic Active Pixel Sensor (MALTA), which can provide good spatial and timing resolutions, is underway. Bench test results of the LGAD and MALTA prototype sensors will be discussed.

   ↳ physics.ins-dethep-exnucl-exPoS(2022)·7 citations
2. 02*

   Cerium ruthenium low-energy antineutrino measurements for safeguarding military naval reactors

   Bernadette K. Cogswell🇺🇸 · Patrick Huber🇺🇸

   The recent agreement to transfer nuclear submarine reactors and technology from two nuclear-weapon states to a non-nuclear-weapon state (AUKUS deal) highlights an unsolved problem in international safeguards: how to safeguard naval reactor fuel while it is on-board an operational nuclear submarine. Proposals to extend existing safeguards technologies and practices are complicated by the need for civilian international inspectors to gain access to the interior of the submarine and the reactor compartment, which raises national security concerns. In this paper we show that implementing safeguards on submarine propulsion reactors using a low-energy antineutrino reactor-off method, between submarine patrols, can by-pass the need for on-board access all together. We find that, using inverse beta decay (IBD), detectors can achieve a timely and high level of assurance that a submarine's nuclear core has not been diverted (mass of around 100 kg) nor its enrichment level changed (mass of around 10 tons).

   ↳ hep-phhep-exnucl-exPRL(2022)·5 citations

* Reconstructed cohort: no mailing for this day survives in the archive. Papers are grouped by their submission times and arXiv's announcement cut-off, assuming announcement without delay; positions follow identifier order. Validated at ~91% exact-day agreement against the archived era.